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Abstract 
Because water is common goods, fixers-using firms will throw waste fixers 
away into the public sanitary sewer in their own benefits, and therefore will 
cause water pollution and make the public sick. The non-point pollution 
resource problem like waste fixers can not be solved by traditional economic 
incentive instruments and Coase Theorem. The waste is hazardous waste, so the 
social optimal level of emission is zero. This paper proposes a combination of 
performance bonds and reverse logistic system to guarantee zero emission 
achieve under Taiwan’s situation. The combination of performance bonds and 
reverse logistic system has double effects: reverse logistic can guarantee firms 
properly return their waste fixers, and therefore no pollution happens. 
Performance bonds can induce the firms to monitor the Hazardous Waste 
Cleaning Agency make treatment in order to get the refunds back. And at last, 
the system could achieve the regulated target, social optimal zero emission. 
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